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Regional economic integration in the EurAsEC member countries is 
increasingly often considered by academics from the point of view of 
cooperation in trade and investment. Much less attention is paid to 
the activities of banking intermediaries which fund these operations. 
The expansion and strengthening of cooperation in the region is 
accompanied by a growing demand for banking services. In the 1990s, 
cross-border banking operations were practically the only international 
system available. In the past few years, financial organisations have 
set up networks in EurAsEC member countries to service their regular 
clients, whose economic interests extend beyond national economic 
boundaries.
The development of mutual cooperation between their banking 
systems includes a commitment by EurAsEC member countries to 
create an integrated financial market as part of the regional bloc, 
in line with the EurAsEC member countries’ Blueprint for Monetary 
Cooperation. Given this situation it becomes expedient to examine 
the level of banking interaction in the member countries and identify 
existing preconditions for the creation of a single banking and 
financial services market.
The	Characteristics	of	Banking	Systems	in	EurAsEC		
Member	Countries
Although the development of banking systems in EurAsEC member 
countries (and in the entire post-Soviet space) has been successful in 
many ways, it is nevertheless not without certain persistent problems.
The banking systems of EurAsEC member countries have evolved 
significantly over the past 15 years. In particular, market reforms in 
the banking sphere have established two-tier banking systems and the 
legal framework for central banks and financial institutions. Financial 
institutions have been increasing their capitalisation in the EurAsEC 
member countries in recent years. In 2006 alone, their combined assets 
increased by over 60%.
Some member countries have switched to International Financial 
Reporting Standards, which are seen to facilitate risk-assessment and 
increase the transparency of banking operations. Banking regulation 
is largely conducted in line with international standards. Following 
recommendations from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
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most member countries have increased the minimum size of authorized 
capital to €5m, thus ptoviding the increase of the capitalisation of financial 
institutions. Some countries have adopted deposit guarantee scheme, 
which is, of course, a significant step forward in the evolution of banking 
systems.
Another positive trend concerns the growing transparency of the 
national banking systems and the increasing role of foreign capital, which 
have helped to boost competition in the market and improve standards in 
banking. IPOs by Russian and Kazakh banks have become more common 
in recent years.
Nevertheless, despite considerable improvement in EurAsEC member 
countries’ banking systems, regional banking markets are quite poorly 
integrated and differ widely in terms of the structure and size of their 
operations. For example, the combined assets of all EurAsEC banking 
systems stood at $625 billion as at 1 January 2007. Moreover, these 
assets are distributed unevenly between EurAsEC member 
countries: Russia accounts for over 85% of the total assets. The second 
biggest banking system – Kazakhstan – accounts for about 11%. Belarus 
and Uzbekistan account for 2% and 1% respectively, while the Kyrgyz 
and Tajik banking systems’ combined share is less than 1%1.
A considerable concentration of banking assets is also apparent 
within national banking systems. Most assets and capital are shared 
by a limited number of financial organisations, which in Soviet times 
were, most often, regional branches of Sberbank or Vneshtorgbank. 
For example, Uzbekistan’s National Bank of Foreign Economic Activity 
accounts for 70% of the country’s total banking assets.
Despite quite high growth rates in banking assets in the six countries, 
their role in servicing the economy is still insignificant. The 
coefficient of financial intermediation, calculated as the ratio of assets to 
GDP, is extremely low in most of the countries in comparison both to 
developed and developing countries (Table 1). The role of the banking 
system is greatest in Kazakhstan where assets account for 86% of 
GDP.
Table	7.1		
Banking sector 
indicators in EurAsEC 
member countries as at 
1 January 2007
Source: Interfax-1000: 
Banks of CIS Countries. 
2006; World Economic 
Outlook Database, 
October 2007
Russia Belarus Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan
Number of 
banks
1189 28 33 28 21 15*
Assets, billion 
dollars
533.4 13.6 69.9 5.8 0.7 0.6**
Capital, billion 
dollars
64.3 2.4 9.2 0.9 0.1 0.1**
Assets/GDP 54.2 36.8 86.3 34.1 24.8 21.4
1 Interfax-1000: Banks of CIS Countries. 2006
* Excluding non-banking organisations and micro-credit institutions
** As at 1 April 2007
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The limited role of banking systems in the economies of the EurAsEC 
member countries makes them considerably dependent on global 
financial markets. Around half of all loans in Russia are issued by 
foreign banks. Cross-border loans now constitute as much as 52% of 
the liabilities of Kazakh banks2. The Kazakh banking system suffered the 
adverse impact of this dependency in 2007 when, owing to the US sub-
prime mortgage crisis and the liquidity crunch that followed it, ratings 
agencies downgraded Kazakhstan’s sovereign rating. This was prompted 
by the anticipation of liquidity shortfalls for Kazakh banks which have 
debt liabilities of around $10 billion.
The structure of each EurAsEC member’s banking system has a 
significant impact on its development. The role of state capital is still 
quite high in some member countries. For example, state-owned banks 
account for over 70% of total banking assets in Belarus, 44.6% in Russia 
and more than 90% in Uzbekistan where the banking system is least 
transparent. This high proportion of state capital affects the banks’ ability 
to perform their financial intermediation function and distorts competition. 
Many state-owned banks enjoy preferential status in connection with 
state-funded projects, and major state-run enterprises hold their accounts 
in these banks. State-owned banks also rely on government support in 
times of difficulty.
Despite the significant development of these banking systems, they 
remain highly vulnerable. According to international ratings agencies, 
risks in the CIS banking system are among the highest in the world, due 
to the existence of the grey economy, the considerable debt liabilities of 
financial organisations, widespread distrust of banks, the poor quality of 
loan portfolios and the existence of “protected” banks.
There is no doubt that the banking systems of EurAsEC member 
countries are at different stages of development. Kazakh and Russian 
banking systems are playing a significant role in this region. However, 
the banking systems of the member countries are highly disparate and 
there is huge variance in their scale, structure, extent of operations and 
level of development.
Interstate	Cooperation	in	Banking	Sphere
 “Formal” interaction within the banking sector is one of the financial 
integration initiatives formulated in 2004 by the heads of state of five 
EurAsEC members. In identifying priorities for EurAsEC development in 
2003-2006 and beyond, the heads of state highlighted the creation of a 
common financial market as a key cooperation priority.
Plans to create a common financial market within EurAsEC were 
incorporated in 2005 in the member countries’ draft blueprint for 
cooperation in the monetary sphere. The blueprint included proposals 
2 Kazakh banks’ high dependence on global capital markets is particularly noticeable in the 
global liquidity squeeze, Standard & Poor’s, 2007.
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for cooperation within the monetary, credit and financial sectors and 
envisaged the step-by-step creation of a common financial market. The 
first stage (2005-2007) was aimed at bringing the banking legislation 
of EurAsEC member countries in line with the Basel Core Principles 
for Effective Banking Supervision; creating conditions for free access 
to national financial markets for legal entity residents in the member 
countries; and concluding bilateral agreements on the establishment of 
national treatment.
The second stage (in 2007-2010) envisages the unification of financial, 
banking and monetary legislation.
The third stage (from 2010) should see the creation of a common 
financial market and ensure free capital movement. 
The success of this plan to create a common financial market largely 
depends on the extent of regional banking cooperation. Close cooperation 
in the sector creates the basis of national financial systems and may help 
to strengthen and accelerate the formal process of economic integration.
In general, a common financial market can only function when certain 
institutional, quantitative and pricing conditions are met. The first of 
these is the abolition of restrictions on the capital movement. Secondly, a 
fair and equal business environment must exist for financial organisations 
setting up foreign branches and offering cross-border services. Thirdly, 
consumers must have free access to services within the regional financial 
market.
The present parameters of national banking markets can be 
quantitatively assessed by analysing the level of mutual provision and 
consumption of financial services through cross-border operations and 
subsidiaries in local markets, and price differentiation. Institutional 
reviews consider existing restrictions on service providers’ and users’ 
mutual access to one another’s markets.
Restrictions	on	equal	access	for	market	players. When post-Soviet 
countries gained independence, local banks became foreign to one another. 
As a rule, the national legislation of EurAsEC member countries 
and bilateral and multilateral agreements between them do not 
establish preferential banking regulations for owners of banks 
who originate from EurAsEC countries, despite the declared 
objectives of regional integration. Therefore banking entrepreneurs 
from EurAsEC member countries are treated like shareholders from any 
other foreign country.
Most favoured nation treatment (MFN) is now granted to bank 
founders from EurAsEC member countries, as it is to other non-resident 
shareholders, but MFN allows to apply restrictions for foreign financial 
organisations. These include exemption from national treatment, and 
thereby create different conditions for domestic and foreign financial 
organisations, including those from EurAsEC member countries.
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These restrictions include limits on aggregate ownership by non-
residents, certain stipulations regarding staffing policies and a ban on of 
the use of certain administrative and contractual business practices.
The most common exemption from national treatment is the imposition 
of a quota on foreign capital. It used to be applied in almost all EurAsEC 
member countries and varied from 12% of total banking authorized 
capital in Russia, to 50% in Kazakhstan (and was also applied to capital 
from EurAsEC member countries). However, member countries have 
been abolishing quantitative restrictions as part of a policy to liberalise 
access for foreign banks. This limit is still applied in Belarus, where 
non-residents do not have the right to own more than 25% of the total 
authorized capital of the banking system.
CIS countries are still imposing restrictions on the staffing policies of 
banks with foreign ownership. These apply both to bank management and 
ordinary staff members. For example, Russian legislation demands that 
at least 50% of managers of a foreign bank should be Russian citizens, 
because they are better acquainted with the specific banking conditions of 
the national market. At least 75% of employees of any bank with foreign 
investment must be Russian citizens.
In some countries legislation limits competition between foreign and 
local banks by applying restrictions on the opening of accounts by legal 
entities. In Belarus, for example, a legal entity has the right to open 
an account only in one bank. As a result, an enterprise is denied the 
opportunity to try other banks and will almost never opt to transfer its 
accounts to another bank.
Also exempt from national treatment are those measures which prevent 
foreign banks exploiting all available forms of service provision. The most 
widespread restriction is a ban on the opening of new branches as a means 
of expansion. A branch of a non-resident bank is not an independent legal 
entity or resident, therefore its activities are regulated by the laws of the 
country of origin of the parent bank. Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and 
Uzbekistan do not allow non-resident banks to open branches.
The policy of some countries regarding branch banking services has 
changed. For example, a branch of an Iranian bank has been set up in 
Tajikistan. The liberalisation of access to Kyrgyzstan’s banking system as 
a result of the country’s accession to the WTO has allowed the National 
Bank of Pakistan to open a branch there.
In addition to the existing legislative restrictions on mutual access 
for market players, post-Soviet countries may also use administrative 
measures and adopt a selective approach in relation to foreign investors. 
This applies particularly to mergers and acquisitions. However, it is fair 
to say that, since buyouts of existing banks in the EurAsEC are few in 
number, these operations are subject to fewer administrative restrictions 
than they tend to be in other sectors of the economy.
In addition, the current inaccessibility of some banking systems 
(Tajikistan, Belarus and Uzbekistan) to foreign investors is a considerable 
obstacle to the integration of markets within the EurAsEC.
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The openness of national banking systems has increased immensely 
in the past few years. Generally, however, the liberalisation of access for 
foreign capital has taken place not under the auspices of the EurAsEC 
but as the result of national banking systems’ integration into the global 
financial market and their preparation for WTO membership.
One of the few documents which EurAsEC member countries have 
adopted which does give preference to its own banking systems concerns 
resident bank access to currency markets of EurAsEC countries. Although 
member countries have ratified this agreement, no specific steps have 
been taken for its realization. Moreover, there are doubts about how 
successfully such measures could be implemented in some countries 
since, according to Paragraph 44 of this document, priority is given to 
obligations under other international treaties.
We believe that, from the point of view of legislating for cooperation 
in banking, it is still too soon to focus on the existence of tangible 
preconditions for the creation of an integrated market. Existing national 
legislation can only confer most favoured nation treatment, while the 
modern trend of reducing exemption from national treatment and 
encouraging banking interactivity is mainly connected with the integration 
of banking systems into the global market, rather than with one another. 
Moreover, the accessibility of national banking systems differs widely 
and, therefore, existing regulatory systems governing banking activity 
have not been harmonised.
These disparities in the regulation of financial institutions create 
serious obstacles to their integration. It is possible that cooperation will 
increase in the future, for example, through unilateral access for EurAsEC 
member country banks to various sectors of the financial market, but this 
cooperation will be somewhat asymmetric in nature.
The	 scale	 of	 bank	 participation	 in	 EurAsEC.	 EurAsEC member 
country banks have been actively penetrating each other’s markets in the 
past few years. In 2007, banks’ investments in the authorized capital of 
the banking sector stood at $522 million, with total assets for controlled 
financial organisations standing at more than $3.8 billion. The investment 
of EurAsEC member country banks in each other’s authorized capital had 
doubled since 2005. This significant growth was facilitated mainly by an 
increase in the size of these banks’ subsidiary branches rather than by the 
establishment of new financial organisations.
The entry of EurAsEC banks into foreign markets has been fairly 
characteristic. Firstly, until recently, their foreign activities tended to 
be one-off ventures, whereas now regional banks have emerged 
whose development strategies involve expansion into post-Soviet 
countries (for example, Kazakhstan’s BTA Bank)3. Secondly, there have 
3 It should be noted that Vneshtorgbank has also developed its regional development strategy and 
focuses its activities in Ukraine and Caucasian countries, and still does not have a single branch 
in the EurAsEC member countries. However, it plans to finalise a deal to integrate Belarus’s 
Slavneftebank into the VTB Group.
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been many cases of banks in the EurAsEC being purchased by but not 
integrating with parent companies, continuing instead to operate under 
existing brands4. For example, BTA Bank has several subsidiaries in Russia 
which did not change their brands after BTA replaced their shareholders. 
Thirdly, EurAsEC member country banks have asymmetric involvement 
in each other’s markets. Russian and Kazakh banks have the greatest 
competitive advantage. In addition, banks in these countries concentrate 
their foreign banking assets in very few countries. For example, 
Kazakh banks have prioritized partnerships within the EurAsEC (Russia 
and Kyrgyzstan), while Russia’s main banking assets are in Belarus and 
outside the EurAsEC (namely, in Ukraine).
We have counted at least 13 banks in EurAsEC member countries 
which are expanding within the community (by comparison, there 24 
such banks in the CIS). Usually, the greatest presence of foreign 
assets is in the form of a small number of leading banks, while 
other banks have only one branch in the region. For example, four Kazakh 
banks – BTA, Kazkommertsbank, ATF Bank and Halyk Bank – account 
for 75% of total investment in the authorized capital of banks in EurAsEC 
member countries. BTA has four subsidiary branches in Russia and one 
each in Belarus and Kyrgyzstan. The other three Kazakh banks each have 
one branch in Russia and one in Kyrgyzstan.
Russian banks are the main foreign banking presence in Belarus, where 
there are subsidiaries of Gazprombank, Bank of Moscow, Rosbank and 
others. In 2007, the role of Russian banks in the Belarusian banking system 
grew as a result of several acquisitions. For example, Belvnesheconombank 
was bought out by Vneshtorgbank, while Mezhtorgbank was taken over by 
Alfa Bank. Ownership of Slavneftebank, formerly controlled by a Russian 
oil company, will also be transferred to Russia’s Vneshtorgbank.
The Kazakh banking system, which is the second largest in the 
EurAsEC, has seen less inward investment by Russian and other EurAsEC 
banks. For some time, only Alfa Bank had a presence in the Kazakh 
market. However, Sberbank recently moved into Kazakhstan through its 
purchase of Texakabank, which in turn owns Russia’s Metrobank, a retail 
banking specialist.
Several Russian banks – Renaissance Capital, for example – are 
operating in Tajikistan. Russian shareholders are present in Kyrgyzstan 
only as minority owners.
With regard to other EurAsEC countries, a major Uzbek bank – Asia-
Invest – has one branch in Russia. Banks in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
and Belarus have not expanded into foreign markets, partly due to the 
relatively small size of their banking systems.
Despite the quite high concentration of foreign assets held by certain 
banks, foreign markets are not the primary target of these 
financial organisations (Figure 1).
4 Buzdalin A. (2006) CIS Banks Increasing Presence in CIS, Kommersant Bank, 21 September.
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 This graph shows Kazakh banks have the most significant foreign 
banking operations. For example, more than 10% of BTA Bank’s assets 
and 14% of its capital are in EurAsEC countries. However, it should be 
noted that most banks which are expanding abroad either set up or buy 
small banks which account for an insignificant share in the country’s total 
banking assets.
Subsidiary banks in the EurAsEC are playing a negligible 
role in national banking systems. Banks from EurAsEC countries 
are a significant foreign presence only in certain countries. For example, 
Kazakh banks are the most active banks in Kyrgyzstan and they have 
bought several Kyrgyz banks. As a result, the share of EurAsEC banks in 
the total capital of the Kyrgyz banking system exceeds 30% (Figure 2).
Figure	7.1		
Foreign network in 
EurAsEC as a share 
of bank’s assets and 
capital at the beginning 
of 2007, %
Figure 7.2  
Share of foreign capital, 
including from EurAsEC 
member countries, in 
the banking system, %
The graph shows that foreign capital is a dominant presence in the 
banking system only in Kyrgyzstan, while its role in other EurAsEC 
countries is minimal.
In general, the level of mutual involvement of EurAsEC banks is 
slowly growing, but relative indicators are still low. For example, the 
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share of EurAsEC bank subsidiaries in the total assets of the EurAsEC 
banking system does not even reach 1% (whereas it stands at 1.2% in 
the CIS and 17% in the EU).
Banking interaction indicates to a certain extent the development of 
economic relations between countries, while asymmetric involvement of 
banks is often explained by the absence of significant bilateral economic 
cooperation. Furthermore, the low capitalisation of EurAsEC banks and 
the continuing high risk of banking activities are tangible obstacles to the 
development of foreign banking activities.
Banks usually expand into foreign markets to service their traditional 
clients and their trade and investment operations. This strategy is called 
“follow the client”, which means that banks create branches only in those 
countries where they have clients. This motivation for foreign expansion 
is typical in the initial stages of the transnationalization of banking and is 
now affecting EurAsEC member countries.
This thesis is borne out by analysis of the correlation between Russian 
and Kazakh banks’ penetration in EurAsEC member countries and trade 
relations in the region. There is a high interdependency in the expansion 
of trade and banking capital. For example, the correlation coefficient 
between banks’ investments and the country’s trade with the EurAsEC 
countries is about 0.99 for Kazakhstan and 0.89 for Russia, indicating 
high direct dependence. However, this correlation for CIS countries is 
lower (0.98 and 0.77 for Kazakhstan and Russia respectively). As a result, 
Russian and Kazakh banks’ expansion in the EurAsEC is proportional to 
the level of bilateral trade.
However, there is not necessarily an economic imperative behind every 
bank’s foreign investments. Russian banks’ very limited involvement 
in Kazakhstan serves as a good example of this. Despite the extensive 
trade relations between Kazakhstan and Russian, economic cooperation 
is mainly in the form of cross-border transactions. Kazakhstan accounts 
for the bulk of correspondent accounts opened by Russian banks in the 
post-Soviet space.
The volume of banking operations between the EurAsEC countries is 
currently growing at lower rates compared to the growth of assets in the 
banking system. That is why investment between banks is minimal and 
cannot be a precondition for the creation of an integrated regional financial 
market. Moreover, banking cooperation is developing asymmetrically 
and the level of unilateral integration of some countries (for example, 
Kyrgyzstan) into the regional banking services market is quite high.
Price	 differential.	 One precondition for creating an integrated 
banking services market is the harmonised cost of loans, which results 
from competition in national and regional markets.
Certain standardisation in the cost of loans can be established by the 
dynamics of the interest rates on loans issued to non-financial sector and 
estimations of their fluctuations (Figure 3).
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The graph shows that interest rates on loans issued to non-financial 
sector have stabilised to a degree since 2004, and that they have 
fallen somewhat in the past five years. At the same time, interest rate 
fluctuations are quite small in Russia and Kazakhstan, but a little greater 
in Tajikistan and Belarus.
Another indicator which allows us to assess price differential in the 
EurAsEC member countries is the dynamic of the banks’ margins between 
interest rates on loans and deposits (Table 2).
Figure	7.3	
The dynamics of 
monthly interest rates 
on loans issued to 
non-financial sector in 
EurAsEC countries
Source: Central banks 
of the EurAsEC member 
countries
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Беларусь 30.1 12.8 10.0 6.6 4.2 2.2 1.1
Кыргызстан 33.5 24.8 18.9 14.1 22.6 20.8 17.6
Россия 17.92 13.06 10.75 8.5 7.61 6.69 6.41
Таджикистан 24.33 15.86 4.99 6.9 10.57 13.52 14.17
Table	7.2	
Interest rate margin 
in EurAsEC member 
countries
Source: International 
Financial Statistics, 
2007, October
The dynamics of the banks’ margin in EurAsEC countries point to an 
insignificant convergence in its rates. Banking margin is relatively high in 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan because of weak competition in their markets 
and the poor development of their banking systems. Vernikov (2006) 
believes that significant differences in money circulation parameters are 
due to the small amount of capital moving between post-Soviet countries5. 
Thus, according to price parameter financial markets of EurAsEC member 
countries are quite divergent. 
The prospects of creation of integrated financial market. In principle, 
the prospects for cooperation between the banking systems of the 
EurAsEC member countries are very favourable. The increase in banks’ 
5 Vernikov A. (2006) Multinational Banks in CIS. Published in a collection of articles, entitled 
“Contradiction of processes of currency and financial integration in CIS”, Moscow.
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penetration of each others’ markets confirms that banking cooperation 
between countries has increased and this is an indirect indicator of a 
growth in trade and investment between them. Integration “from the 
bottom up”, i.e., by the increase in cooperation between business 
structures, normally signals to the authorities that they should create 
favourable institutional foundations to encourage cooperation. However, 
the region’s countries have not yet created the framework for attracting 
banking capital from EurAsEC member countries because there are often 
institutional restrictions to this. The market’s infrastructure has not 
developed to the degree that is necessary in order to boost cooperation 
in the banking sphere.
Currently, banking systems are developing by integrating into the 
global, rather than into the regional banking services market. This has a 
dual impact on mutual cooperation within the EurAsEC. On the one hand, 
it facilitates the liberalisation and harmonisation of banking regulations 
necessary for creating an integrated banking services market. On the 
other hand, global financial markets are diverting the banks’ focus away 
from regional cooperation.
A further substantial obstacle to cooperation is the expected takeover 
by Western financial organisations of EurAsEC banks which are expanding 
into neighbouring markets. For example, Kazakhstan’s ATF Bank, which 
has branches in Russia and Kyrgyzstan, was taken over by the Italian 
UniCredit Group in 2007. We believe that BTA Bank is also a likely 
takeover target for a Western bank.
The fact that integration initiatives in the former Soviet space have 
stalled is further hindrance to the formation of a common policy for the 
banking sector. In such conditions, a paradox emerges: integration is 
delayed, but business interaction has been growing. We believe this is 
because the facilitation of bilateral and multilateral banking cooperation is 
not the key factor in ensuring the growth of this cooperation.
The promotion of investment and trade and relative stability in the 
national banking systems, the competitive advantage of major banks in 
less developed EurAsEC banking markets and prospects for economic 
growth all play a huge role in developing banking cooperation. In 
the future, cross-border operations and the establishment of regional 
networks, including through takeovers, will increase banking cooperation 
in the former Soviet space. Major Kazakh and Russian banks that wish to 
become regional banks with network in all CIS countries will make the 
greatest contribution to the development of banking cooperation.
It is possible that the future model for cooperation in the CIS will 
be based on the spheres of influence of Russian and Kazakh capital. For 
example, Russian interests will not be focused in countries that belong 
to a certain supra-national integration organisation but in the European 
countries of the CIS (Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova). Central Asia will 
be Kazakhstan’s sphere of influence, while the Caucasus will fall into the 
spheres of influence of both Russia and Kazakhstan (Figure 4).
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However, this development model does not preclude the presence of 
Russian banks in Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan, for example. It envisages that 
Kazakh capital will play a dominant role in the banking systems of these 
countries.
It is also expected that banking cooperation will develop mostly on a 
bilateral basis. For example, Russia’s financial cooperation with Belarus 
and Ukraine will increase (even though the latter is not member of the 
EurAsEC). Since domestic financial markets are not well developed, it is 
expected that stock-market players as well as banks will be implicated in 
the cooperation process. For instance, Russian banks will help Belarusian 
and Ukrainian companies enter the Russian stock market.
Kazakhstan is also adopting a similar strategy and has set up a regional 
financial centre in Almaty (RFCA) based on the Kazakh Stock Exchange 
(KASE). The RFCA’s major advantage is its international status, which 
allows foreign issuers and investors to enter the market. It is anticipated, 
for example, that a list of potential issuers of the RFCA will include 
large- and medium-sized Kazakh companies and medium-sized Russian, 
Ukrainian and Central Asian enterprises.
The pursuit of formal integration through the creation of an integrated 
financial market and the abolition of restrictions is being addressed in 
two ways. The 2005 blueprint for cooperation between EurAsEC member 
Figure	7.4	 
The spheres of influence 
of Russian and Kazakh 
banking capital
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countries in the monetary sphere involves measures relating to financial 
and banking cooperation. The three-stage implementation of this blueprint 
will result in the abolition of restrictions on the movement of capital and 
the harmonisation of banking legislation. However, this will fall short of 
creating a fully integrated (i.e. reciprocally linked) financial market.
Adopting similar standards for the activities of banks and financial 
organisations will not encourage markets to converge and will not 
eradicate disparities. A possible outcome of this blueprint will be the 
uneven development of national markets with similar standards and 
the absence of restrictions on the movement of capital, but it is very 
likely that the deficient development of local banking services markets 
will persist. Domestic demands for a common financial market are not 
sufficient, but the system should not be imposed by external authority, 
since the integration process results logically in financial integration at 
a later stage.
Taking into account the current level of financial cooperation in the 
EurAsEC, we believe that it would have been more profitable to create 
a regional capital market which would reduce dependency on foreign 
sources of funding. To achieve this would require the establishment of 
a stable, rather than a single financial market in the EurAsEC member 
countries.
EurAsEC and CIS countries could look to the example of Asia Pacific 
countries, which chose to reduce the role of foreign loans by developing a 
regional bond market which is less exposed to global crises.
We believe that this is a very effective mechanism which reduces 
exposure to currency risk and keeps resources within the region in the 
long term. However, there are certain obstacles to its achievement, for 
instance, the absence of sovereign ratings for some countries. Also, this 
mechanism could be launched only in a limited number of countries 
(Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus).
Given their present status, a substantial role in the model of CIS 
financial markets could be played by multilateral development banks 
(the Eurasian Development Bank and the CIS Interstate Bank). Capital 
markets can be developed only through the redistribution mechanism 
operated by multilateral development banks (raising funds through bonds 
and transforming them into loans). As a result, post-Soviet countries 
would be able to place their funds not on the global financial markets 
but in the former Soviet space, helping not just to retain capital in the 
region but also to boost economic growth. This mechanism of developing 
economies and financial markets will have a wider geography (compared 
to the development of the bond market).
As a result, we believe that the creation of a formal common financial 
services market is premature. It would be more beneficial to take steps 
to increase stability within national financial systems, to increase their 
capitalisation and to develop a regional capital market.
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